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INTRODUCTION: THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
INCIDENT
Charles H. Norchi *

On April 20, 2010 an explosion occurred on the BP Deepwater
Horizon offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, killing eleven crew
members, seriously injured sixteen, and sinking the rig. By July 15,
when the oil flow was arrested, the Macondo well had discharged 4.9
million barrels of oil into marine waters.1 The continuing damage to the
marine environment, the wider ecosystem, and to coastal human activity
is still unknown. In this Symposium—The Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill:
Impacts, Responses, and Prevention—the contributors appraise the
regulatory and institutional pathologies that contributed to the incident,
offer projections based on current practices and legal frameworks,
propose alternative institutional and regulatory approaches, and
recommend policies to achieve a preferred future for marine ecosystems
and dependent human activity.
There are earlier oil spill incidents that, in retrospect, amounted to a
trend. Alan Sielen writing in this volume describes the 1969 Santa
Barbara oil platform spill, the 1979 Bay of Campeche blowout in the
Gulf of Mexico, the 1989 Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound of
Alaska, and the 2002 wreck of the tanker Prestige off the Spanish coast.
However Deepwater Horizon is different. It is one of those rare marine
environmental events that has acquired the characterization of an
“incident,” or a prism through which reactions at multiple levels can be
assessed for acceptable risks and behavior, for systemic pathologies,
policy preferences, and for alternatives in law, science, industry practice
and policy. Through the incident prism, contributors to this symposium
* Professor of Law and Director, Marine Law Institute, University of Maine School
of Law.
1. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind,
Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/
03spill.html?scp=1&sq=Gulf%20Spill%20Is%20the%20Largest%20of%20Its%20Kind,
%20Scientists%20Say&st=cse.
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appraise natural resource damage assessment, collection and distribution;
federal oversight of Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas activities;
problems in spill response; the use of dispersants; renewable ocean
energy resources; proposal for a department of the environment; and
fisheries conditions in the Gulf of Mexico.
From the Symposium contributions, it is clear that the incident did
not begin on April 20, 2010. The explosion was the culmination of a
decision process that long predated that date and which now merits close
parsing and appraisal. Future decision-makers and students of this event
will want to know about the informational bases upon which prior
decisions were made, the relevant legal prescriptions on the books at the
time, the application of those prescriptions to behavior and events,
procedures for handling substandard practices and behavior that lead up
to the explosion, and the efficiency of regulatory agencies including any
institutionalized practices for appraising internal processes and functions
that could render decision-making in its entirety responsive and robust.
Readers of this Symposium will find answers to those inquiries and be
oriented to the events that culminated in the Deepwater Horizon incident
and the context in which decisions were made. In turn, they will also
find key aspects of the critical task of planning for, and hopefully
averting, similar future incidents.
The full impact of the event remains unknown. In her article, The
Value of a Pelican: An Overview of the Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Under Federal and Louisiana Law, Melissa Trosclair Daigle,
Legal Coordinator, Louisiana Sea Grant Law & Policy writes the
numbers of dead fish and fowl, “do not capture the true impact of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. It is impossible to get an accurate count of
the birds, fish, insects, reptiles, and mammals that died and sank to the
ocean floor or decomposed unseen in the marsh, or of the microscopic
organisms that inhabit the range of ecosystems that were affected by the
spill.” 2 Against this reality, she describes the Natural Resource Damage
Assessment (NRDA) whose goal is “to make whole the natural resources
and the public’s loss of the use of those resources that are damaged or
destroyed by the discharge of oil.”3 Ms. Daigle examines the unique
challenges the complicated Deepwater Horizon spill presents to the
assessment and recovery process that is unfolding pursuant to federal and
state law. The incident did not merely generate immediately discernable
2. Melissa Trosclair Daigle, The Value of a Pelican: An Overview of the Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Under Federal and Louisiana Law, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 253, 253-54 (2011).
3. Id. at 246.
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affects, but also post-outcome uncertainties that complicate the goal of
making the environment and the citizenry whole.
In Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster, Andrew Hartsig, Arctic Program Director for Ocean
Conservancy, observes that, “the Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed
systemic weaknesses in the administration of oil and gas activities on the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). It also underscored the difficulty of
stopping and responding to a major oil spill, even in the relatively
accessible and temperate waters of the Gulf of Mexico . . . . These
shortcomings affected the full spectrum of OCS activities, from planning
for OCS oil and gas lease sales, to administering offshore exploration
and development activities, to planning and implementing oil spill
response efforts.”4 Systemic weaknesses contributed to ineffective
decision-making. Mr. Hartsig describes the existing framework for
federal oversight of OCS oil and gas activities, including oil spill
preparation and response, and compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). He then recommends detailed policy
and legislative solutions that address flaws in the framework following
the National Commission’s recommendation of regulatory policies
pertaining to the oversight of offshore drilling.
In Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage Assessment:
Where does the Money Go?, Nicholas J. Lund, Ocean and Coastal Law
Fellow at the National Sea Grant Law Center at the University of
Mississippi and Niki L. Pace, Research Counsel with the MississippiAlabama Sea Grant Legal program, continue the appraisal of the natural
resource damages problem. Specifically, the authors treat the delicate
issue of collection and distribution of restoration funds pursuant to the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Via a review of prior experiences, they clarify
some of the attendant controversies and uncertainties in a process whose
goal is to ensure that the responsible party makes the environment
“whole” again.
Russell V. Randle, a partner at Patton Boggs LLP, in Spills of
National Significance and State Nullification, reveals certain deficiencies
in the spill response and identifies factors at the core of the problem and
means to adjust and correct them. He reviews responsible party issues,
roles of state and federal government, information deficiencies in
decision-making, and enhanced response to avert nullification. After
4. Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 269, 269-70 (2011).
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canvassing particular experiences, Mr. Randle recommends specific
changes to the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the federal regulation
governing oil and hazardous substance response, which could resolve
nullification and related problems. He underscores the lessons that can
be applied to future spill response planning to avoid repeating the errors
of the Deepwater Horizon experience.
In responding to a catastrophic oil spill, the treatment can render the
patient worse. Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez, staff attorneys at the
Center for Biological Diversity, clarify this in their article, Dispersants:
The Lesser of Two Evils or a Cure Worse than the Disease. Beginning
with the decision to approve BP’s use of subsea dispersant, they review
the statutory framework for regulating dispersants, significant wildlife
species and human impact, lessons from the Deepwater Horizon incident
and the need for scientific investigation that could inform the application
of existing laws and future policy adjustments.
Yet the lifestyle demanded by most human beings living in the
developed spaces of our planet has determined that we live in a
hydrocarbon present. But is there an alternative energy future? Todd J.
Griset, an attorney with the firm Preti Flaherty, addresses this possibility
in Harnessing the Ocean’s Power: Opportunities in Renewable Ocean
Energy Resources. He provides an “overview of the opportunities for the
production of usable power from ocean energy resources other than oil
and gas, as well as the legal regimes applicable to, and policy questions
relating to that production.”5 Mr. Griset makes the case that renewable
energy resources derived from the oceans is not merely a projection, but
that technologies to extract usable power are available now. He
describes ocean wind, marine hydrokinetic technologies, ocean thermal
energy conversion and legal regimes applicable to each. Rendering
renewable energy resources from the seas economically feasible requires
incentives that Mr. Griset describes. These renewable resources may be
nearer to our energy present owing to the Deepwater Horizon incident.
The incident may also be a catalyst to reconsider the institutional
framework for all environmental decision-making.
Should such
decision-making along with executive authority be located in a
Department of the Environment? Alan B. Sielen, Senior Fellow for
International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity
and Conservation, in the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, makes the
affirmative case for a new federal Department of the Environment. He
asserts the Deepwater Horizon spill was preventable and addresses the
5. Todd J. Griset, Harnessing the Ocean’s Power: Opportunities in Renewable
Ocean Energy Resources, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 395, 396 (2011).
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systemic industry and government failures at its roots. Mr. Sielen
describes the problem of environmental decision-making dispersal across
the government including conflicts among agencies. He describes how a
Department of the Environment could resolve those problems and
produce leadership that is now urgently required nationally and
internationally.
How do habitats and species recover from the effects of oil, methane,
and dispersants? The problem of capacity recovery is explored by Ashley
McCrea-Strub and Daniel Pauly of the University of British Columbia in
their article Oil and Fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. They explain that
“estimates of the quantity of oil, natural gas and associated methane and
chemical dispersants released as a result of this calamity has been
plagued by uncertainty.”6 Hence, it is difficult to project the long term
impact on habitats and marine organisms. In the face of this difficulty,
they offer an assessment of this uncertain future in a study that draws
upon databases of spatially allocated fisheries data. Their work holds
dire implications for commercial fisheries of the Gulf of Mexico.
Appraising the Deepwater Horizon incident unveils demands and
claims in what has been famously called The World Public Order of the
Oceans.7 This is a process in which nation-states and many other
participants including corporations, navies, scientific organizations,
NGOs, and individuals assert ocean demands and claims that generate
outcomes embodied in regulations, court decisions and events, some of
which are catastrophic. Even when the process unfolds within the
jurisdiction of a coastal state, the impact is eventually global and it
affects world public order. Thus, how a particular nation-state and its
governmental agencies treat a critical ocean incident of national
significance, is studied and appraised by decision-making elites
elsewhere who also have national interests in the oceans and in the assets
and resources that the seas might generate. This is especially relevant as
new areas of continental shelf oil exploration open in the Arctic, Africa,
Australia, Brazil and Russia.
Among the nation-states whose elites appraise incidents of national
significance, such as Deepwater Horizon, are China and India, two
governments that intensely demand hydrocarbon resources. These
societies are at stage of economic development that will shape their
decision calculus. Their scale of values, including acceptable ecosystem
6. Ashley McCrea-Strub & Daniel Pauly, Oil and Fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico, 16
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 473, 473 (2011).
7. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS:
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (Yale Univ. Press 1975)
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risks, will be different than ours. Their vast populations, their drive for
industrial development across multiple sectors, their energy-dependent
military expansions are overwhelming factors in decisions affecting
oceans usage including hydrocarbon extraction and marine ecosystem
protection.
And the connectivity of our oceans renders our
environmental fates co-dependent. It is in the global common interest
that these newly empowered players, these rising hydrocarbon
civilizations, learn the lessons of the Deepwater Horizon incident.
The Deepwater Horizon incident and the articles in this Symposium,
also remind us of the scale of values of the mature hydrocarbon
civilizations of the Americas and Europe. How is that scale to be
balanced? What trade-offs are societies willing to accept? Is the value
of environmental well-being which directly bears on human health,
preferred over the value of wealth and its maximization derived from
cheaper energy? Are individuals and households prepared to accept
higher consumer product and fuel costs in return for greater
environmental safeguards?
Which commercial activity is to be
favored—oil and gas exploration with its attendant risks, or fisheries and
ecotourism? The skill required to access resources deep within the
continental shelf is available to highly developed nation-states and
corporations within those nation-states. That investment in skill, in turn,
contributes to the wealth and power of the nation-state. The defense of
the homeland and the projection of military power are dependent on
energy resources, mostly hydrocarbon. Are nation-states willing to
sacrifice diminished power for the well-being of the marine
environment? Is a healthy environment also a component of power—
what Joseph Nye has termed “soft power”?8 How will those choices be
made and who will make them?
The Deepwater Horizon catastrophe generated a profoundly negative
impact on the marine environment of the Gulf of Mexico including a
range of coastal impacts bearing upon the human condition. It is a
critical incident in the ocean and coastal law of the nation because it is
shaping normative expectations at multiple social levels and with that,
the decision-making calculus of political, legal, and corporate elites.
Perhaps America is prepared for an adjustment in its scale of values, a
post-Deepwater Horizon national self-scrutiny along with a clarification
of broader goals and how to reach them. That is a latent theme of this
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal Symposium. Our contributors to The
8. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS x
(2004) (“Soft power . . . is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments.”).
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Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Impacts, Responses, and Prevention, have
delivered more than scholarly appraisals of the Deepwater Horizon
event. Through the prism of that incident, they have provided normative
guidance for current and future decision-makers. And every concerned
reader of this volume is a potential decision-maker who can contribute to
a preferred marine ecosystem future in the common interest.

